


NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, RI

**FORCE PROTECTION:
It's Time for a Joint Force Component Commander for
Antiterrorism/Force Protection**


by
Edward S. Wagner, Jr.
Lieutenant Commander, USN

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 

5 February 2001

 2/2/01
Captain P. T. Toohey, USN Date
Faculty Advisor

20010511 057

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: C		7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207	
8. Title (Include Security Classification): FORCE PROTECTION: IT'S TIME FOR A JOINT FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION (UNCLAS)			
9. Personal Authors: LCDR EDWARD S. WAGNER, JR., USN			
10. Type of Report: FINAL		11. Date of Report: 05 FEB 2001	
12. Page Count: 21		12A Paper Advisor (if any): CAPT P. T. TOOHEY, USN	
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Antiterrorism, Force Protection, Joint Force Component Commander, Terrorist, Combating Terrorism.			
15. Abstract: As today's military operations increasingly involve non-traditional application of our military services, our enemy also becomes non-traditional. There is essentially no credible force that can assert its military might against our armed forces in the traditional methods of warfare. Therefore, they must resort to unconventional attacks against our armed forces with the intent of constructing an atmosphere of terror among our forces and weakening the national will of our citizens at home. Forces critical to the Operational Commander are threatened daily by terrorist organizations on both a local and global level. Success today depends upon the strong defense of our forces. This can only be accomplished by standardizing our force protection procedures, integrating those procedures into our training, fully funding both training and equipment and placing one individual in charge of executing those procedures, the Joint Force Component Commander for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract:	Unclassified X	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461		20. Office Symbol: C	

Abstract

FORCE PROTECTION: IT'S TIME FOR A JOINT FORCE COMPONENT COMMANDER FOR ANTITERRORISM/FORCE PROTECTION

As today's military operations increasingly involve non-traditional application of our military services, our enemy also becomes non-traditional. There is essentially no credible force that can assert its military might against our armed forces in the traditional methods of warfare. Therefore, they must resort to unconventional attacks against our armed forces with the intent of constructing an atmosphere of terror among our forces and weakening the national will of our citizens at home. Forces critical to the Operational Commander are threatened daily by terrorist organizations on both a local and global level. Success today depends upon the strong defense of our forces. This can only be accomplished by standardizing our force protection procedures, integrating those procedures into our training, fully funding both training and equipment and placing one individual in charge of executing those procedures, the Joint Force Component Commander for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.

“ . . . worldwide presence and continuous transit of ships, aircraft and units of the United States military support the engagement elements of both the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy and are in the nation’s best interest. The U.S. military is conducting overseas operations in a new post-Cold War world environment characterized by unconventional and transnational threats. Operating in this new world exposes U.S. Forces to terrorist attacks and requires a major effort in force protection. . . .”

USS COLE Commission Report 9 January 2001¹

Introduction

As Global Terrorism becomes more prevalent and increasingly threatens our forces, we must standardize our force protection procedures, integrate antiterrorism into our training cycles, raise our antiterrorism tactics knowledge at every level, and most importantly provide funding for training and equipment.

Today’s Joint Force Commander must have a Force Protection Component Commander. As operations increasingly involve non-traditional application of our military services, our enemy also becomes non-traditional. Forces critical to the Operational Commander are threatened daily by terrorist organizations on both a local and global level. Terrorists strike at the very heart of our values. They attempt to weaken our resolve to strengthen and support democracy in our world. President Kennedy in his inaugural address stated “. . . Let every nation know, whether it wishes us well or ill, that we shall pay any price, bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any friend, oppose any foe to assure the survival and the success of liberty . . .”²

¹ Department of Defense, DoD USS COLE Commission Report, Executive Summary, (Washington, DC: 9 January 2001, < <http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/cole20010109.html> >[10 January 2001].

² John F. Kennedy, “Inaugural Address”, January 20, 1961, Washington, DC, < <http://www.hpol.org/jfk/inaugural> > [19 January 2001].

Today, we must live up to those words and continue to maintain our strong commitment to those nations whose democratic ideals are well cemented as well as to those who struggle daily to survive. Secretary of Defense William Perry said it best when he stated, "The task of protecting our forces would be easy if we were willing to abandon or compromise our missions, but that is not an option. We have global interests and global responsibilities. Those require our forces to be deployed overseas to protect our national security interests."³

Success of our mission depends upon the strong defense of our forces. This can only be accomplished by standardizing our force protection procedures, integrating those procedures into our training and placing one individual in charge of executing those procedures, the Joint Force Component Commander for Antiterrorism/Force Protection.

Three major terrorist incidents have left indelible marks upon the military forces of the United States. They are the Marine Barracks attack in Beirut, the Khobar Towers bombing and most recently the attack against the USS COLE. I would like to briefly summarize those incidents here.

The Attack Against U.S. Marine Barracks, Beirut, Lebanon on October 23rd, 1983

"At approximately 0622 on Sunday, 23 Oct. 1983, the Battalion Landing Team headquarters building in the Marine Amphibious Unit compound at Beirut International Airport was destroyed by a terrorist bomb. The catastrophic attack took the lives of 241 Marines, sailors, and soldiers and wounded more than 100 others. The bombing was carried out by one lone terrorist driving a yellow Mercedes Benz stake-bed truck that accelerated through the public parking lot south of the BLT headquarters building, where it exploded. The truck drove over the barbed and concertina wire obstacle, passed between two Marine guard posts without being engaged by fire, entered an open gate, passed around one sewer

³ Hon. William J. Perry, Report to the President, The Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad, (Washington, DC: September 15, 1996), < http://www.defenselink.mil/pubs/downing_rpt/report_f.html > [28 November 2000].

pipe barrier and between two others, flattened the Sergeant of the Guard's sandbagged booth at the building's entrance, penetrated the lobby of the building and detonated while the majority of the occupants slept. The force of the explosion [12,000 pounds] ripped the building from its foundation. The building then imploded upon itself. Almost all the occupants were crushed or trapped inside the wreckage."⁴

The Attack Against Khobar Towers on June 25th, 1996

Khobar Towers is a compound built by the Saudi Government near Dhahran that housed the residential quarters of almost 3,000 U. S. military personnel of the 4404th Air Wing (Provisional), along with military personnel from the United Kingdom, France, and Saudi Arabia. U.S. military personnel first occupied this compound in 1991 during the Coalition force buildup before the Gulf War.

"Shortly before 10:00 p.m. local time on Tuesday, June 25, 1996, a fuel truck parked next to the northern perimeter fence at the Khobar Towers complex. Air Force guards posted on top of the closest building, Building 131, immediately spotted the truck, and suspected a bomb as its drivers fled the scene in a nearby car. The guards began to evacuate the building, but were unable to complete this task before a tremendous explosion occurred. The blast completely destroyed the northern face of the building, blew out windows from surrounding buildings, and was heard for miles. Nineteen American service members were killed and hundreds more were seriously injured. Many Saudis and other nationals were also injured."⁵

The Attack Against USS COLE on October 12th, 2000

"A terrorist bomb ripped open the Aegis destroyer USS COLE (DDG-67) while the warship was mooring in the port of Aden about noon on 12 October. The blast tore a hole approximately 40 by 40 feet in the port side of the amidships hull, killing 17 sailors outright and injuring 39 others."⁶

⁴ Robert L. J. Long, Admiral, USN (Ret), Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983, (Washington, DC: December 20, 1983), VII.

⁵ Perry.

⁶ Norman Polmar, "Terrorism Strikes the U.S. Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings (November, 2000): < <http://www.usni.org/proceedings/articles00/propolmar1100.htm> > [28 November 2000].

These three terrorist incidents, although different in some respects, all have a single thread that binds them together. Each incident was specifically targeted at U.S. military forces in an attempt to deter American military actions then ongoing at the time. One incident, the Marine Barracks bombing at Beirut, ultimately resulted in the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from that area; terrorism works is the assessment. The second, the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia, did not result in withdrawal of U.S. Forces and spurred numerous reviews of our military antiterrorism force protection procedures, terrorism loses. The outcome of the latest incident, the bombing of the USS COLE in Yemen, has yet to determine our long-term commitment but did result in the suspension of port calls by U.S. Navy ships, terrorism wins again. At least for the moment.

Current Procedures

Force Protection, by definition, has a much broader scope than just antiterrorism.

“Force Protection is defined as the security program designed to protect soldiers, civilian employees, family members, facilities, and equipment, in all locations and situations, accomplished through planned and integrated application of combating terrorism (antiterrorism and counter terrorism), physical security, operations security, personal protective services, and supported by intelligence, counterintelligence, and other security programs.”⁷

The complete analysis of our force protection procedures is too broad in scope for the purposes of this paper and so the focus of this effort will be limited to antiterrorism.

The Defense Department has numerous instructions and directives dealing with antiterrorism. In the past, they have been "advisory" rather than "directive" in nature.⁸

⁷ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness, CJCS Handbook 5260 (Washington, DC: 1 January 1997), 20.

⁸ Perry.

While numerous revisions and improvements were made following the Khobar Towers bombing, standardization, funding, as well as unity of effort and training priority are still lacking.

Various joint publications, directives, and instructions address force protection/antiterrorism responsibilities and procedures. Most notable are, DoD Directive 2000.12; DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program; DoD Instruction 2000.14; DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures; DoD Instruction 0-2000.16; DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards; Joint Publication 3-07.2; Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism; and CJCS Handbook 5260; Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness. Together these references form the basis of how we currently train and organize our defenses against terrorist attack. There is a comprehensive listing of responsibilities across the spectrum of training and support from the SECDEF down to individual unit commanders. However, there are some weak points in the armor that is meant to protect our forces.

According to DoDD 2000.12, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) is the principal advisor responsible to the Secretary of Defense for DoD AT/FP issues. It also identifies DoD's AT/FP policy to protect DoD elements and personnel from terrorist acts as a high priority item that should be accomplished through the implementation of an all-encompassing program using an integrated systems approach recognized for its excellence and sustainability. Additionally, it states that the geographic CINCs' force protection policies take precedence over all force protection policies or programs of any DoD Component deployed in that command's area of responsibility (AOR) and not under the security responsibility of the DoS. It further defines the CINC's role by specifying that the CINC or a

designated representative (for example, a Component commander or JTF commander) shall delineate the force protection measures for all DoD personnel not under the responsibility of the DoS and establish command policies and AT/FP programs for the protection of all assigned forces in the AOR.⁹

This clearly shows that there is not only a commitment to protect our forces by DoD but also a recognition that the geographic CINC is the best person to determine force protection policies for his area of responsibility.

DoD Instruction 2000.14 assigns the Service Secretaries responsibility for the designation and training of installation or base Antiterrorism Officers as well as a unit or ship Antiterrorism Officer. In both instances, the instruction specifies that this position may be a collateral duty. The recommended training consists of attendance at the "Combating Terrorism on Military Installations and/or Bases Course." Additionally, it delineates the CINC's responsibility to designate a staff office to supervise, inspect, test, and report on the base antiterrorism programs within theater. It specifies that at least one individual will be trained in AT procedures and that the recommended training consists of attendance at the "Combating Terrorism on Military Installations and/or Bases Course" or parent Service-approved equivalent. It also states that when possible, the training should be accomplished before assuming AT/FP responsibilities.¹⁰

Although the instruction defines responsibility for designating and training AT/FP Officers, it falls short of giving this critical position the priority it deserves. An AT/FP

⁹ Department of Defense, DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program, DODD 2000.12 (Washington, DC: 1999), 1,3,4,12,13.

¹⁰ Department of Defense, DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures, DODI 2000.14 (Washington, DC: 1994), 4-6.

Officer who serves as such in a collateral duty is acceptable according to this instruction and training consists of attendance at a 5-day course of instruction.

Geographic Combatant Commanders are required to designate a staff office to supervise, inspect, test, and report on the base antiterrorism programs within theater. However, only one individual is required to be trained in AT procedures and that training is the same 5-day course identified in the previous paragraph and the required training is not mandated before assuming AT responsibilities. This clearly indicates a lack of prioritization for AT/FP training.

In a recent review of antiterrorism/force protection procedures prompted by the attack on the USS COLE in Yemen, the Cole Commission, headed by retired General William W. Crouch, USA and retired Admiral Harold W. Gehman, Jr., USN, published the following findings and recommendations regarding AT/FP training.

Finding: Military Services must accomplish AT/FP training with a degree of rigor that equates to the unit's primary mission areas.

Recommendations:

- Secretary of Defense direct the Services to develop rigorous tactics, techniques, and procedures with measurable standards for AT/FP training and develop training regimens that will integrate AT/FP into unit-level training plans and pre-deployment exercises.
- Secretary of Defense direct the Services to elevate AT/FP training to the equivalent of a primary mission area and provide the same emphasis afforded combat tasks in order to instill a force protection mindset into each Service.

Finding: DoD and Service guidance on the content of AT/FP Level III training must be more definitive if commanders at the O-5 and O-6 levels are to execute their AT/FP responsibilities.

Recommendation: Secretary of Defense direct more rigorous Level III AT/FP training requirements for each Service.¹¹

It is my opinion that these findings and recommendations clearly identify the need for the AT/FP Officer to serve in a primary billet with more extensive training requirements and that training completion at a required standard be completed prior to assuming duty as the AT/FP Officer or joining an AT/FP staff. This is critical to establishing credibility.

DoD Instruction 0-2000.16 mandates that Combatant Commanders, Chiefs of Service, and Directors of DoD Agencies and Field Activities shall ensure that an AT/FP Officer, responsible to the Commander for AT/FP requirements, is assigned at each installation or base, and deploying organization. Additionally, it requires Commanders at all levels who deploy with their unit outside the United States, and its territories, and possessions to have an AT/FP Officer and/or Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO), or equivalent, assigned as the AT/FP subject matter expert and advisor. This individual is required to ensure each person within the unit is aware of the terrorism threat, and is trained to employ methods to reduce risk or mitigate the effects should an attack occur.¹²

On the surface this requirement appears to be quite acceptable, however, it too falls short in that it does not specify a minimum rank or experience level and even allows a Non-Commissioned Officer to fill the billet. I am quite certain that many NCOs are more than capable of performing admirably in this position, given the proper level of training and

¹¹ Cole Commission Report.

¹² Department of Defense, DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards, DODI 0-2000.16, Change 1, (Washington, DC: 1999), Enclosure 1, E1.1.1, E1.1.23, E1.1.23.1.

experience, but this may cause some difficulties when coordinating procedures or requirements as an E-7 will not have the same political clout as an O-5 or O-6.

Within U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet Carrier Battle Groups, the force protection officer is normally a collateral duty, not defined specifically regarding rank or experience requirements. Current Navy battle group force protection officers range in rank from O-4 to O-6 and none are primary billets.¹³

The Cole Commission also published this finding and recommendation regarding force protection officer capabilities.

Finding: Service Level II AT/FP Training must produce a force protection officer capable of supervising unit training and acting as the subject matter expert for the commander in transit.

Recommendations:

- Secretary of Defense direct the Services to establish more rigorous training standards for unit-level Force Protection Officers.
- Secretary of Defense direct the Services to increase the emphasis and resources devoted to producing qualified Force Protection Officers through Level II training.¹⁴

Although the finding and recommendations are not specific as to rank structure required, it is my opinion that the AT/FP Officer must be of significant rank and experience so as to command the respect and trust of the ship's crew or unit's personnel.

Recommendations

TERRORISM. The very mention of this word conjures up a spectrum of emotions that most people hope they never have to deal with. Fear, confusion, and anger are just a few

¹³ Don D. Milburn, MACM, USN, COMNAVAIRLANT Force Protection Officer, telephone conversation with author, 23 January, 2001.

¹⁴ Cole Commission Report.

of these. Nevertheless, what really is terrorism? "The term 'terrorism' is defined as "the calculated use of violence or threat of violence to inculcate fear; intended to coerce or to intimidate governments or societies in the pursuit of goals that are generally political, religious, or ideological." "¹⁵ That is the official definition. The practical definition is that terrorists are simply criminals. Therefore, antiterrorism is nothing more than crime prevention at an elevated level. The same types of things we do to make our homes less vulnerable to criminals we do to make our troops & facilities less vulnerable to terrorists. Unfortunately, funding for programs is normally linked to statistics and there is no data base that we can access that will tell us how many times a terrorist group did not attack us due to the prevention measures that were in place.

We have to make certain assumptions when dealing with an unknown variable. One of those is that terrorists are always planning an attack on us. We must be continually mindful of our habit patterns and the fact that a terrorist could be observing our actions and reactions, waiting for the right moment to strike. Terrorists are patient. A positive mindset and awareness are essential to the successful defense of terrorism. The attitude of it will not happen to me is just unacceptable. Look at the measures that we take to deter criminals from our homes. We purchase burglar alarms and post signs saying so. We buy guard dogs, hold our mail and newspaper deliveries and place lights on timers while we are on vacation. All this is done in the hope that our efforts will deter the criminal. We essentially send the message, go somewhere else, the risk to you, Mr. Criminal, is too great here. The same thing

¹⁵ Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism, Joint Pub 3-07.2 (Washington, DC: 17 March 1998), I-1.

must be done to safeguard our military forces. However, all these measures have a cost associated with them.

Funding for the added requirements of today's force protection needs is critical to its successful implementation.

"Since force protection is an integral part of every military mission, the costs are dispersed among the various mission expenditures such as training, equipment, and operations and maintenance. As a consequence, force protection expenditures traditionally are not isolated and treated as separate budget items. Moreover, when we are faced with unique force protection requirements, we fund them on an ad hoc basis. . . . However, with force protection now given a higher overall mission priority, we need to ensure force protection also is given a higher overall budget priority in the allocation of defense resources."¹⁶

This statement was not made recently, although it certainly does apply. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry made this remark in his report to the President after the bombing of Khobar Towers in 1996. After the Beirut bombing, the Long Commission recommended that the Secretary of Defense take the following action: 1) Improve the collection, analysis and dissemination of intelligence, particularly human intelligence, by developing all source intelligence fusion centers, and 2) Enhance the defensive capabilities of forces against unconventional attacks through the development of doctrine, planning, organization, force structure, education and training.¹⁷ We cannot continue to publish reports that call for increased action and funding and not follow through. Additionally, intelligence collection and its timely analysis and distribution is critical to the successful prevention of a terrorist

¹⁶ Perry.

¹⁷ Brian Michael Jenkins, "Statement," Long Commission, The Lessons of Beirut, (Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1984), 13.

act. The creation of a Force Protection Component Commander must include a fused, all source organic intelligence cell and a mandate that would require intelligence to be shared between all intelligence agencies both foreign and domestic as well as host nation agencies.

With all this said, how can we best organize our joint force protection structure? To begin, we must make two assumptions. First, that the Department of Defense is truly committed to the deterrence and prevention of terrorist acts against its forces. Secondly, that the U.S. Government will fully fund the increase in force structure, training, and equipment that will be required to actively combat terrorism.

These requirements can best be accomplished by establishing a Joint Force Component Commander for Antiterrorism/Force Protection (JFCC-AT/FP) within each Geographic Commander in Chief's (CINC's) area of responsibility who reports directly to the CINC on matters of antiterrorism/force protection. This must be a primary warfare duty, fully staffed and funded and will require significant revision to current Joint Publications, Directives and Instructions. A comprehensive review of the legal responsibility inherent in Command, such as that found in Naval Warfare Publication 1-14M "The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations", would also have to be undertaken due to the fact that antiterrorism/force protection would now fall under the cognizance of the JFCC-AT/FP. This reorganization would in no way affect a unit commander's inherent right of self-defense.

This new JFCC-AT/FP must have all regional security and antiterrorism forces assigned under his command. This structure would have significant benefits in both economy of force and unity of effort. All doctrine, training, and equipment would fall under the JFCC-AT/FP, this would enable forces to easily understand their respective tasks and

eliminate any cross service ambiguities regarding procedures and semantics. The regional security and antiterrorism forces must be permanently based in Theater; this would give them a distinct advantage over rotational forces that deploy on a temporary basis. The only way to become an expert in an area of operations is to live and work in that area and maintain an active liaison with host nation authorities. This expertise in local culture and customs is critical to understanding the subtle nuances that may dictate success or failure.

Chain of Command

The Cole Commission also found that an organization needed to be developed within the Secretary of Defense's Office that would make better use of DoD resources regarding combating terrorism.

Finding: Combating terrorism is so important that it demands complete unity of effort at the level of the Office of the Secretary of Defense.

- Recommendation: Secretary of Defense develop an organization that more cohesively aligns policy and resources within DoD to combat terrorism and designate an Assistant Secretary of Defense (ASD) to oversee these functions.¹⁸

The JFCC-AT/FP should report directly to his respective CINCs but also have a coordination role with the Joint Staff for AT/FP issues as well as a separate budget. The JFCC-AT/FP should be structured similar to USSOCOM in that forces would fall under the operational command and control of the JFCC-AT/FP regardless of service component. Once force structure requirements are determined and forces are identified and assigned to the JFCC-AT/FP, they should be redesignated as antiterrorism forces. The most logical link between the CJCS and the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) would be through the Assistant

¹⁸ Cole Commission Report.

Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict (ASD (SO/LIC)). Operations should be coordinated through the J-34 Directorate of the Joint Staff. The J-34 should also be elevated to full director status as the Director for Antiterrorism/Force Protection. This would allow a separate Program Objective Memorandum (POM) to be submitted to SECDEF ensuring the JFCC-AT/FP a separate budget that would not be subject to interpretation or misappropriation. The funding, training, equipping, and organization of antiterrorism forces would then fall directly under the new Director for Force Protection/Antiterrorism at the JCS level.

Intelligence is a critical link to a proactive antiterrorism force. Another finding and recommendation by the Cole Commission confirms this.

Finding: DoD does not allocate sufficient resources or all-source intelligence analysis and collection in support of combating terrorism.

Recommendations:

- Secretary of Defense reprioritize all-source intelligence collection and analysis personnel and resources so that sufficient emphasis is applied to combating terrorism. Analytical expertise must be imbedded, from the national, CINC, and Component Command levels, to the joint task force level.
- Secretary of Defense reprioritize terrorism-related human intelligence and signals intelligence resources.
- Secretary of Defense reprioritize resources for the development of language skills that support combating terrorism analysis and collection.¹⁹

The JFCC-AT/FP must have an Intelligence Cell dedicated to antiterrorism.

Emphasis should be on the proactive tracking of all known terrorist organizations and analysis of their operations and capabilities as well as predictions of future operations. This

¹⁹ Ibid.

JFCC-AT/FP Intel Cell must have the authority to interact and coordinate with all intelligence groups in DoD as well as DoS, CIA, FBI, NCIS, and international investigative agencies. In other words, they must have carte blanche to go wherever and do whatever it takes to get the information required to protect our forces and halt terrorists before incidents take place. Although the JFCC-AT/FP's mission is in the antiterrorism realm, an active coordination/liaison and information exchange must be maintained with the counter terrorism forces at USSOCOM.

Consideration should also be given to the utilization of forward deployed U.S. Coast Guard Port Security Units and Law Enforcement Detachments to provide security for U.S. Navy ships when entry into a non-U.S. port facility is required. This would greatly reduce the risk to ships and allow for more effective use of the ship's crew while preparing for deployment. General Crouch and Admiral Gehman commented in their report on the Cole attack that "... Transiting units do not have time or resources to focus on a series of locations while in transit, requiring these units to rely on others to support their efforts to deter, disrupt and mitigate terrorist attacks. We think it is the Component Commander who has the operational war-fighting mindset for the region and is capable of controlling the resources to fight the fight and tailor specific AT/FP measures to protect transiting units. . .

„20

Conclusions

The recommendations contained in this paper will require an extensive review and modification of existing publications ranging from Joint and Service doctrine to review of

²⁰ Ibid.

current laws that govern a commander's responsibility under the law of armed conflict. The number of people required to implement such an ambitious restructuring of our force is significant to say the least. Moreover, the cost in dollars will be tremendous. Many people will question the viability of such a structure, that it is just too expensive to implement. However, what price do we place on a human life or our prestige and credibility as a nation in the world, not to mention the readiness of our forces?

During the Cold War, our forces were much larger than we see today. We were in a war then with an enemy that threatened the existence of our nation. We are now in another war that has the potential to threaten us perhaps even more than the Soviet Union did. The Soviets were quantifiable; we could point to the numbers of troops, planes, and tanks and justify our force structure. We were even able to negotiate rules governing the way we interacted with each other. The terrorist is neither quantifiable nor does he play by the rules and that is what makes him so dangerous.

We must make a decision. If the risk from terrorism that we currently face is acceptable, then our current procedures and practices are adequate, and we need not invest more than what is currently being done. However, I do not believe this is the case and neither do others I have quoted here. Freedom comes at a price. It requires an investment of money, time, and sacrifice. We as a nation have always been resolute in our defense of democracy and liberty. This determination continues today as evidenced by remarks made by President George W. Bush during his inaugural address

“... The enemies of liberty and our country should make no mistake: America remains engaged in the world by history and by choice, shaping a balance of power that favors freedom. We will defend our allies and our interests. We will show purpose without arrogance. We will meet aggression and bad faith

with resolve and strength. And to all nations, we will speak for the values that gave our nation birth. . . .”²¹

Establishment of a Joint Force Component Commander for Force Protection focused on antiterrorism will significantly improve the protection of our military forces deployed abroad. Each geographic warfighting CINC must have his own Force Protection Component Commander with forces assigned, fully funded, and equipped with state of the art tools to combat today’s terrorist. The scope of his responsibility should be limited to antiterrorism. Doctrine, training, and equipment must be joint in nature and standardized across all services in order to achieve a maximum economy of force and unity of effort.

This is not just a wish list or a nice to have option; it is a here and now requirement! We must keep faith with the men and women of our armed forces. We recruit them telling them we are the best fighting force in the world; there are none better. Yet, we fail to protect America’s children, husbands, and wives from common criminals who garner headlines, strike fear into America’s heartland, and promote their causes at the expense of the defenders of freedom. We have a legal, ethical and moral obligation to provide our military forces with the best possible protection that the world’s most powerful armed force can provide. The Joint Force Component Commander for Antiterrorism/Force Protection can meet that obligation.

²¹ George W. Bush, “Inaugural Address”, January 20, 2001, Washington, DC, <<http://www.whitehouse.gov/press/inaugural-address.html>> [23 January 2001].

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Bush, George W. "Inaugural Address", January 20, 2001, Washington, DC. < <http://www.whitehouse.gov/press/inaugural-address.html> >
- Cochran, Douglas R., LtCol, USAF. "Force Protection Doctrine: An Operational Necessity." (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College). Newport, RI: 1998.
- Crouch, William W., General, USA (Ret) and Gehman, Harold W., Jr., Admiral, USN (Ret). "DOD News Briefing, Special Briefing on the COLE Commission." Washington, DC: November 2, 2000.
- Downing, Wayne A., General, USA (Ret). Force Protection Assessment of USCENTCOM AOR and Khobar Towers. Washington, DC: August 30, 1996.
- Estes, Howell M., LtGen, USAF. "DOD News Briefing, Khobar Towers Bombing." Washington, DC: July 12, 1996.
- Jenkins, Brian Michael. The Lessons of Beirut: Testimony Before the Long Commission. Santa Monica, CA: The Rand Corporation, 1984.
- Kennedy, John F. "Inaugural Address", January 20, 1961, Washington, DC. < <http://www.hpol.org/jfk/inaugural> >
- Long, Robert L. J., Admiral, USN (Ret). Report of the DOD Commission on Beirut International Airport Terrorist Act, October 23, 1983. Washington, DC: December 20, 1983.
- Milburn, Don D., MACM, USN. COMNAVAIRLANT Force Protection Officer. Telephone conversation with author, 23 January, 2001.
- Perry, Hon. William J. Report to the President, The Protection of U.S. Forces Deployed Abroad. Washington, DC: September 15, 1996.
- Polmar, Norman. "Terrorism Strikes the U.S. Navy." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. November, 2000. < <http://www.usni.org/proceedings/articles00/propolmar1100.htm> > [28 November 2000].
- Rancich, Thomas, LCDR, USN. "Combating Terrorism." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings. November, 2000. < <http://www.usni.org/proceedings/articles00/prorancich.htm> > [28 November 2000].
- Smith, Randy R., LtCol, USMC. "Force Protection: Casualties, Consensus, and an Operational Commander's Dilemma." (Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College). Newport, RI: 1999.

- U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Antiterrorism/Force Protection (AT/FP) Program. DODD 2000.12. Washington, DC: 1999.
- U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Combating Terrorism Program Procedures. DODI 2000.14. Washington, DC: 1994.
- U.S. Department of Defense. DoD Combating Terrorism Program Standards. DODI 0-2000.16, Change 1. Washington, DC: 1999
- U.S. Department of Defense. DoD USS COLE Commission Report, Executive Summary. Washington, DC: 9 January 2001.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Commander's Handbook for Antiterrorism Readiness. CJCS Handbook 5260. Washington, DC: 1 January 1997.
- U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Antiterrorism. Joint Pub 3-07.2. Washington, DC: 17 March 1998.
- U.S. Navy Department. The Commander's Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations. NWP 1-14M. Washington, DC: 1995.